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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
Case No. 20050013-CA

v.
ROBERT CRAIG THOMAS
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Defendant appeals his sentence from two consolidated judgments of conviction:
(1) Possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004), and attempted forgery, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-101, 76-6-501 (West 2004); and (2) theft by
deception, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (West
2004), and attempted unlawful use of a financial transaction card, a class A misdemeanor,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-101, 76-6-506.1 (West 2004). See R6470:2-6;
R5292:3-6.]

Sentencing was consolidated for district court case numbers 041906470 and
041905292. This Court consolidated the cases under a single case number on appeal,
20050013-CA. See Order of Consolidation, 3 May 2005. For purposes of clarity, citation
to the pleadings and transcript in original case number 041906470 will begin with the

This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did defendant affirmatively waive any objection to the trial court's denial
of probation when he told the court that he wanted to go to prison rather than
submit to a 90-day diagnostic evaluation?
No standard of review applies. Because defendant led the trial court into any
possible error in denying probation, review is foreclosed even for plain error. See State v.
Finder, 2005 UT 15,ffi[62-63, 114 P.3d 551, 564 (declining review of claimed
instructional error where defendant "signaled] by an affirmative act that he had no
objection" to the instruction below); State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111,
123 (holding that if "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented . . . that
he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, [the appellate court] will not review the
instruction" even under plain error exception).
2. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion in imposing consecutive
terms where the record reflects that the trial court considered all required statutory
factors?
No standard of review applies. Defendant made no timely objection to the trial
court's sentence or imposition of consecutive terms. Because defendant has not argued

designation "R6470," while citation in original case number 041905292 will begin with
the designation "R5292."
2

plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim may not now be reviewed. See
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review claim of
unpreserved error absent request for plain error review).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are cited in the body of
this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As noted above, defendant appeals his sentence from two consolidated judgments
of conviction.
Facts relevant to Meier & Frank incident.2 On July 26, 2004, defendant and his
girlfriend used a stolen credit card to purchase $289.29 in merchandise from Meier &
Frank in West Valley City. Supp. at 2. They had previously tried to use the card to
purchase an additional $324.02 in merchandise. Id. West Valley police arrested the
couple as they left the store. Id. After questioning defendant, police found the stolen
credit card and wallet in a trash can near the mall food court. Supp. at 3. Inside the
wallet was another credit card receipt from Circuit City for $1142.00. Id. When police
searched defendant's car, they found all the merchandise bought with the stolen credit

2

Because defendant pleaded guilty in both cases, the facts are taken primarily from
the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), see R5292:74 (manilla envelope), and PSI
Addendum, see Supplemental Record (manilla envelope). Because the Supplemental
Record contains complete copies of both the PSI and the PSI Addendum, the State's brief
will cite to the Supplemental Record, e.g., Supp. at .
3

card except for a television set. Id. Police also discovered drug paraphernalia, an
additional stolen credit card, and a stolen checkbook. Id. The state did not bring formal
charges against defendant for these crimes until 6 October 2004. R6470:2.
Facts relevant to 7-11 incident. On 11 August 2004, approximately two weeks
after the Meier & Frank incident, on 11 August 2004, defendant tried to pass a stolen
check for $30.63 at a 7-11 store. Supp. at 7. When confronted by a store employee,
defendant tried to flee, but was apprehended by a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper who had
just entered the store. Id. The trooper searched defendant's bag and found a glass drug
pipe and two baggies containing methamphetamine. Id. Defendant was charged by
information for this incident on 17 August 2004. R5292:3.
Defendant claimed that he was given the stolen checks and credit cards by a
"friend of a friend" who said it was "okay to use them." Supp. at 3, 7.
Charges and plea agreements. As a result of the Meier & Frank incident,
defendant was charged with unlawful use of a financial transaction card, a third degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-506.2(1) (West 2004); theft by deception,
a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (West 2004);
possession of a forged writing, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-6-502 (West 2004); unlawful use of a financial transaction card, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-506.2(1) (West 2004); theft by
deception, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (West
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2004), and two counts of theft by receiving stolen property, both class B misdemeanors,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (West 2004). R6470:2-4.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, on 26 October 2004, defendant pleaded guilty to one
count of theft by deception, a third degree felony and an amended charge of attempted
unlawful use of a financial transaction card, a class A misdemeanor. The remaining
charges were dismissed. R6470:26, 28-41.
As a result of the 7-11 incident, defendant was charged with possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-501 (West 2004); possession of a forged writing, a third degree

felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-502 (West 2004); possession of
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (West
2004), and attempted theft by deception, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-405 (West 2004). R5292:3-4.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, on 21 September 2004, defendant pleaded guilty to
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony and an amended charge of
attempted forgery, a class A misdemeanor. The remaining charges were dismissed.
R5292:24-32.

5

Consolidated sentencing hearing. A consolidated sentencing hearing was held
on 3 December 2004. R6470:63.3 The trial court had before it the PSI prepared for the 711 incident, and a PSI Addendum prepared for the Meier & Frank incident. See
R6470:63 at 1, 3. The PSI and Addendum recommended incarceration, based on
defendant's extensive history of drug addiction and incarceration, including the fact that
he had already completed three different substance abuse treatment programs:
[Defendant] has been committed to prison in three different jurisdictions
those being Utah, Oklahoma and in the Federal Prison System. He was
likewise placed on probation in multiple jurisdictions. Within three months
of his last release from prison he resumed his criminal activity by
committing the present offenses. He completed three different substance
abuse programs (including CATS in 2001), and yet he did not cease his
drug use or criminal activity. There are numerous substance abuse
treatment programs available at the Utah State Prison if the defendant
chooses to take advantage of them.
Supp. at 6; see also Supp. at 2, 5. The PSI Addendum notes:
[Defendant] claims to be and likely is, judging by his history, a drug addict.
However, he is also a criminal preying on others to support his addiction as
well as meet his needs. He continues to hang on to his criminal value
system. He will give no information as to how he came by the wallet, the
check book, the other credit card or to whom he gave the television while
all the while maintaining he is through with crime and drugs. [Defendant]
has a long history of incarcerations, both State and Federal with little
observable change. He was committing new crimes within three months of
release from prison in May [2004] and it is highly unlikely [defendant]
would commit to an inpatient program. To complicate matters he is intent
on continuing his relationship with his girlfriend/co-defendant. It is

3

A transcript of the consolidated sentencing hearing is found at both R6470:63 and
R5292:73.
6

unlikely incarceration in this matter will induce any changes in the
defendant but it will protect the community for a while.
Supp. at 2.
Before proceeding with the consolidated sentencing hearing, the trial court asked if
there were any "inaccuracies or omissions that have not been previously pointed out" that
either party wanted to "call to [her] attention?" R6470:63 at 1. Defense counsel asked the
trial court to clarify a typo that erroneously suggested defendant owed restitution. Id. at 2.
The trial court agreed with defense counsel's reading of the PSI. Id. Thereafter, defense
counsel argued that she disagreed with Adult Probation and Parole's (AP&P)
recommendation of incarceration. Id. at 3. According to defense counsel, in-patient
treatment at Odyssey House was "the only hope for [defendant]." Id. at 2. Defense
counsel argued that defendant admitted being an addict, that he believed the prior drug
abuse programs he had completed were "not enough, and that he want[ed] to do an
intensive inpatient program." Id. at 3.
The trial court asked if a "diagnostic" had been completed for defendant. Id.
When defense counsel indicated that it had not, the trial court stated that a "diagnostic
evaluation" would be helpful. Id. Defendant interjected that he had had a diagnostic
evaluation in Idaho. Id. When defense counsel clarified that it was "[a] long time ago,"
the trial court explained that she "may find to order a diagnostic, given the intensity of the
statement of AP&P's recommendation[.]" R6470:63 at 4.

7

The trial court then heard from two of defendant's victims, both of whom asked
that defendant "be given a sentence that will make him review his actions and realize
what he does to others, and find respect for the judicial system." R6470:63 at 5; see also
id. at 7 (agreeing with the prior victim and stating: "I think that if there are choices, that
[defendant] should receive something on the severe side").
Following the victims' comments, the trial court stated that she was ordering a
diagnostic evaluation and that defendant's sentence would include "significant"
incarceration:
I'll be frank with you, counsel, and indicate to you that I'm doing the
diagnostic evaluation because I believe in looking at all alternatives, but
frankly at this point I'm inclined to send him to prison. But we will see
how he performs in the diagnostic unit, and whatever the penalty is going to
be it's going to involve a significant amount of time behind bars.
You need to be prepared for that. It's not going to be a month or
two. And so I'd put your best foot forward, sir, at the diagnostic center, and
if you do treat this as a joke, or flippantly, as the individual has indicated,
when you're in for evaluation, the consequences will be real and significant.
R6470:63 at 7-8. When the trial court thereafter ordered a 90-day diagnostic evaluation,
defendant interjected: "Just send me to prison, then." R4670:63 at 8. The following
dialogue ensued:
THE COURT:

You'd just like to go to prison?

DEFENDANT:

Just send me to prison. I ain't doing no
evaluation. I ain't wasting ninety days.

8

THE COURT:

You don't waste it. You get credit for
time served. You don't think you can do
a diagnostic evaluation?

DEFENDANT:

I can do a diagnostic.

THE COURT:

So why don't you want to do it?

DEFENDANT:

Because they're going to recommend
prison automatic. Every—your Honor,
every time I've been in front of anybody,
I went straight to prison. They send me
to prison. I don't get no chance in there.
I'm a drug addict. I'm sorry for what I
did to them people. You think I like
doing what I do? No, I don't like doing
it. I want to go to Odyssey House where
I can get some help. Diagnostic—I'm
going to go to diagnostic. No matter
what I say, no matter what I do in
diagnostic, they're going to send me to
prison. They're going to send me to
prison. The board's going to look at that
ninety days, and they're going to go, "So
what?"

THE COURT:

First of all, they don't make the decision;
I make the decision. But your attitude
leaves a lot to be desired. Do you want
to go directly to prison?

DEFENDANT:

I want to go to Odyssey House where I
can get some help is where I want to go,
your Honor.

THE COURT:

That's why I'm doing the diagnostic
evaluation. Do you understand that?

9

DEFENDANT:

No, I don't. I really don't. All I know is
every time I get around them, they send
me to prison.

R6470:63 at 8-9. The trial court inquired if defense counsel wanted to confer with
defendant, "or should I just send him to prison?" R4670:63 at 9. Defense counsel said
she would confer with defendant in the holding cell and the trial court proceeded to
consider other matters. Id.
When the sentencing hearing resumed, the trial court confirmed that defendant had
pleaded guilty to two third degree felonies. R4670:63 at 9-10. The trial court then
informed defendant that his "attitude" had had "an impact on [her]." Id. at 10.
Accordingly, the trial court determined "to do what [defendant] asked and .. . that is
sentence you to prison." Id. Defendant responded: "Okay, your Honor. Thank you." Id.
The trial court then imposed consecutive terms of zero-to-five years for the two third
degree felonies, and consecutive jail terms of twelve months each for the two class A
misdemeanors. R6470:43-44; R5292:45-46.4 At defense counsel's request the trial court
clarified that defendant was entitled to credit for time served. R6470:63 at 10. When
defendant asked if the trial court had said "consecutive," the trial court responded
affirmatively: "I said consecutive. Your attitude has made a big difference in what I

4

The Sentence, Judgment, Commitment was signed on 3 December 2004. See
R6470:43-44 andR5292:45-46.
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intended to do." Id. Neither defense counsel nor defendant further commented on the
sentence. Id.
Motion for relief from judgment denied. On or about 16 December 2004,
defendant filed a motion for "relief from judgment," requesting that his prison terms be
made concurrent. See R6470:45-46 (the motion is stamped 22 December 2004).
Defendant's motion was accompanied by a proposed Order to that effect. See R5292:59.
After amending the proposed Order by interlineation to read, "denied—sentence is
consecutive," the trial court signed it on 21 December 2004. Id.
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on 30
December 2004. R6470:51-52; R5292:61.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant led the trial court into any possible error in denying probation
and imposing incarceration. Specifically, defendant refused to undergo a 90-day
diagnostic evaluation, a prerequisite to the trial court's willingness to consider probation,
and repeatedly stated that he would rather go to prison. Because the trial court ultimately
did as defendant requested and, given defendant's refusal to undergo evaluation, any error
was invited and may not now be reviewed, even for plain error.
In any event, defendant has not and cannot show any abuse of the trial court's
considerable sentencing discretion. The trial court sentenced defendant within the
statutory terms for the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. Moreover, the trial court

11

knew from the PSI and the PSI Addendum that defendant was not a likely candidate for
rehabilitation and had already received the benefit of three drug abuse treatment
programs. The trial court also witnessed defendant's negative attitude first hand, during
their exchange at the sentencing hearing. Thus, given the strength of AP&P's
recommendation that defendant not be granted probation and defendant's refusal to
submit to a diagnostic evaluation, the trial court properly determined that incarceration
was justified. Because the trial court was in the most advantaged position to make this
highly individualistic assessment, this Court should defer to the trial court's decision.
Point II. Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the trial court's imposition
of consecutive terms. Defendant's only arguable objection to the consecutive terms was
filed thirteen days after the judgment was signed. Even then, defendant merely requested
concurrent terms and wholly failed to identify the legal and factual assertions he raises for
the first time on appeal. As defendant does not allege plain error or ineffective assistance
of counsel, his challenge to the consecutive sentences may not now be reviewed.
Even assuming that defendant preserved his challenge, it lacks merit. Defendant
claims that the trial court erroneously focused on his "poor attitude" and thus failed to
consider, as required by statute, his rehabilitative needs. Contrary to defendant's claim on
appeal, the record reflects that the trial court was well acquainted with information in the
PSI and PSI Addendum regarding defendant's history, character, and dim prospects for
rehabilitation, well before defendant obstinately refused to submit to a diagnostic

12

evaluation. Moreover, there is no requirement that the sentencing court make express
findings regarding each of the relevant statutory factors, nor is there any requirement that
each factor be given equal weight. Because the court had before it information detailing
all legally relevant factors, the only supportable conclusion is that it appropriately
considered all of the evidence before sentencing defendant to consecutive terms. Thus, it
cannot be said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court
here. Defendant, therefore, has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing consecutive terms.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED HIS CHALLENGE TO
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PROBATION WHEN HE TOLD
THE COURT THAT HE WANTED TO GO TO PRISON RATHER
THAN SUBMIT TO A 90-DAY DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION
In Point A of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying him probation. Aplt. Br. at 13 ("The sentencing judge abused her discretion in
imposing the maximum possible terms"). Specifically, defendant contends that the trial
court misperceived his "attitude" at the sentencing hearing, and that this misperception
"formed the entire basis for [the trial court's] decision." Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant
affirmatively waived this claim.

13

A. Defendant led the trial court into any possible error.
First, defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him
to prison instead of probation is foreclosed by the invited error or affirmative waiver
doctrine.5 As set forth in the statement of the case, supra, defendant repeatedly stated at
sentencing that he would rather go to prison than submit to a diagnostic evaluation. See
R4670:63 at 8-9. Indeed, defendant effectively presented the trial court with two
sentencing options to which he was amenable: probation without a diagnostic evaluation
or prison. Id. Because the trial court refused to grant probation without the benefit of a
diagnostic evaluation, the court granted defendant's alternative desire—prison. R4670:63
at 10. Indeed, defendant responded without objection: "Okay, your Honor. Thank you"
Id
Given that the trial court did as defendant asked, any possible error here in denying
probation and sentencing defendant to prison was invited and may not now be reviewed
even for plain error. State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ^flj 62-63, 115 P.3d 551, 564 (declining
to review claim of instructional error where defendant "signaled] by an affirmative act
that he had no objection" to the instruction below). See also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT
22, Tf 54, 70 P.3d 111, 123 (holding that if "counsel, either by statement or act,
affirmatively represented that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, [the

defendant's challenge to the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms is set
forth in Point II, infra.
14

appellate court] will not review the instruction" even under plain error exception); State v.
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) (declining to reach plain error claim—where
non-objection was conscious strategy—because it would "be sanctioning a procedure that
fosters invited error").
B.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
probation and imposing a prison sentence.

Even if defendant's challenge to the trial court's imposition of prison over
probation were not precluded, he fails to show any abuse of the trial court's vast
sentencing discretion. "The decision whether to grant probation is within the complete
discretion of the trial court." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991)
(citing State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 395 (Utah 1957)). Indeed, "[t]he only legal
restriction is that the trial court not exceed the bounds of discretion." Id. A trial court has
"broad discretion in imposing sentence within the statutory scope provided by the
legislature." Id. at 1051. Moreover, a trial court has no obligation to favor rehabilitation
over punishment. Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393 ("Probation is not a matter of right, and this is
so no matter how unsullied a reputation one convicted of a crime may be able to
demonstrate to the trial judge"). Rather, "the [trial] court is empowered to place the
defendant on probation if it thinks that will best serve the ends of justice and is
compatible with the public interest." Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051 (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to statutory terms for the third degree
felonies and class A misdemeanors to which he pleaded guilty. R6470:28-40; R5292:2415

31. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203(3) (West 2004) ("A person who has been
convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
follows: . . . In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-204 (West
2004) ("A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to
imprisonment as follows: (1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not
exceeding one year"). Thus, defendant's sentence, on its face, does not constitute an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).
Moreover, the trial court knew from the PSI and PSI Addendum that defendant had
an extensive and dismal drug history, having received the benefit of three prior drug
abuse treatment programs during his years of incarceration. Supp. at 2, 6. In addition, the
trial court observed first hand defendant's unwillingness to submit to a 90-day diagnostic
evaluation. R6470:63 at 8. Given the strength of AP&P's incarceration recommendation
and defendant's refusal to submit to a diagnostic evaluation, the trial court recognized
that defendant was not a good candidate for rehabilitation. See, e.g., State v. Nuttall, 861
P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) (no abuse of discretion where the trial court emphasized
punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating him); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 11719 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that sentencing judges generally give considerable weight to
circumstances of crime). Such a disposition is well within the discretion of a sentencing
court and should therefore be affirmed.

16

This Court should defer to the trial court's judgment. The trial court was in the
most advantaged position to make the highly individualistic assessment required to
fashion a just and appropriate sentence. Contrary to defendant's assertion, sentencing
"necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court." State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d
665, 671 (Utah 1997) (quotations and citation omitted)). Certainly, the trial court's
assessment of defendant's character was based at least partially on its personal
observation of defendant's body language, demeanor, and tone of voice, none of which
are reflected in the cold record on appeal. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah
1994).
In this case, the trial court evaluated the evidence, exercised its discretion within
the bounds of the law, and imposed proper statutory penalties for the offenses to which
defendant pleaded guilty. Because it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] would
take the view adopted by the trial court," the court did not abuse its discretion. Gerrard,
584 P.2d at 887.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
TO MAKE DEFENDANT'S TERMS OF INCARCERATION
CONSECUTIVE WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS THAT THE
TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED ALL THE REQUIRED
STATUTORY FACTORS
In Part B of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of
consecutive terms. Aplt. Br. at 19-21. The trial court's imposition of consecutive terms
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should be affirmed, first, because defendant failed to raise a timely or specific objection,
and second, because defendant's claim of error lacks merit.
A.

Defendant failed to make a timely or specific objection to
his consecutive sentences.

This Court will not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. State v.
Cruz, 2005 UT 45,133,

P.3d

; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346;

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Here, defendant did not preserve a
challenge to the legality of the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences and,
therefore, appellate review is waived. State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d All, All (Utah App.
1987).
As set forth in the Statement of the Case, supra, defendant did not request
concurrent terms or argue against consecutive sentences at the consolidated sentencing
hearing. See R6470:63 at 1-10. Moreover, when the trial court imposed consecutive
terms, defendant merely inquired: "Did she say consecutive?" R6470:63 at 10. Neither
defendant nor defense counsel objected to the trial court's pronouncement of consecutive
sentences, let alone asserted that the trial court had failed to consider the statutory
requirements, as defendant now claims on appeal. Id; see Aplt. Br. at 19-21 (alleging
trial court failed to consider required factors set out in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(2)
(West 2004)). And while defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment thirteen days
after the trial court signed the minute entry imposing consecutive sentences, he merely
requested concurrent terms. He did not suggest even at that time, that the trial court had
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not considered the statutory requirements. See R6470:45-46. Thus, even assuming that
defendant's post-judgment motion was appropriate and timely, he failed to identify the
legal and factual assertions that he now raises in his appellate brief. Id. The trial court
summarily denied the motion by interlineation, amending the proposed Order to read
"denied—sentence is consecutive." R5292:59.
This Court has previously suggested that prompt and specific preservation of any
objection to consecutive sentences is required for appellate review. See State v. Perez,
2002 UT App 211, f 46, 52 P.3d 451 (noting defendant's prompt objection and trial
court's overruling thereof before proceeding to reach alleged error on appeal). That is
consistent with Utah's contemporaneous preservation rule. See State v. McCardell, 652
P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982) ("This is clearly a case where a timely and specific objection
would have afforded the trial court the opportunity to address McCardelPs concerns").
Utah courts require timely and specific objections "in order 'to bring all claimed errors to
the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if
appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted).
See also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346 ('"[T]he trial court ought to be
given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it'") (quoting
State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989)).
"Accordingly, an objection 'must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that
the trial [court] can consider it.'" Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 33 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at
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361) (internal quotations omitted in original)). Here, any arguable objection defendant
made to the imposition of consecutive sentences was not only untimely, but also nonspecific. His belated request for concurrent terms was insufficient to alert the trial court
to defendant's claim on appeal, that the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitative
needs as required by statute. See id. at \ 34 (holding that Cruz's objection to jurors'
conversation did not preserve his objection to alleged juror bias); State v. Eldredge, 111
P.2d 29, 35 ("An objection based on competency does not call the trial court's attention to
the reliability issue"); State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that
defendant's discovery objection "certainly cannot be said to have alerted the trial court to
the foundation problem" of the witness's testimony and thus the objection was
unpreserved). Defendant thus failed to preserve below his challenge to the trial court's
imposition of consecutive terms. As defendant does not allege plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel, his claim may not now be reviewed. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d
1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review claim of unpreserved error absent
request for plain error review).
B.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
consecutive terms of incarceration.

Even assuming that defendant's appellate challenge to the imposition of
consecutive sentences were preserved, imposing consecutive terms is well within the
discretion of a sentencing court. Section 76-3-401, governs the trial court's authority to
impose consecutive sentences. This statute directs the court to "consider the gravity and
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circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Section 76-3-401(2). A trial court may thus abuse
its discretion if it imposes consecutive terms without considering all of the factors that are
legally relevant to the sentencing determination. See, e.g., State v. McCovey, 883 P.2d
1234, 1235 (Utah 1990); State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996).
The court's discretion in weighing the statutory factors, however, reflects the
general principle that courts are accorded broad discretion in sentencing matters. As
noted previously, it is the trial court, after all, that is in the most advantaged position to
make the highly individualistic assessments required in sentencing decisions. Woodland,
945 P.2d at 671. In deciding the appropriateness of a particular sentence, a trial court
must consider many intangibles, like the defendant's "character, personality, and attitude,
of which the cold record gives little inkling." Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393; see also State v.
McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980).
Here, defendant complains that because the trial court focused on his "attitude," it
necessarily ignored the relevant statutory factors listed in section 76-3-401(2) in imposing
consecutive sentences, specifically, his rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Br. at 19-21.
The crux of defendant's argument is that the trial court misinterpreted his response to the
court's request for a 90-day diagnostic evaluation. Aplt. Br. at 19-21. According to
defendant, his reaction was neither obdurate nor a manifestation of his "poor attitude."
Aplt. Br. at 15. Rather, defendant argues that the trial court should have perceived his
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conduct as reflecting only "his desire for and commitment to treatment." Aplt. Br. at 16.
However, "the fact that that [defendant] view[ed] his situation differently than did the
trial court does not prove that the trial court neglected to consider the factors listed in
section 76-3-401(4)." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 14, 40 P.3d 626.
Defendant's complaint is similar to the unsuccessful challenge to consecutive
sentences raised in Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 10. Defendant, like Helms, "encourages this
[Cjourt to assume that the trial court did not consider the factors at all, simply because it
did not address each of the factors on the record." Id. Just as Helms did, however,
defendant fails to show that the trial court did not consider "the gravity and circumstances
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs
[of defendant]." Section 76-3-401(2).
As made plain in Helms, the sentencing court is not required to make a record of
its consideration of each factor. 2002 UT 12, ^f 11. Moreover, section 76-3-401(2), while
directing consideration of all factors, does not require the court to accord each of the
factors equal weight. See, e.g., Howell, 707 P.2d at 117-119 (recognizing that sentencing
judges generally give considerable weight to circumstances of crime); State v. Carson,
597 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1979) (judge has discretion in determining weight given to
sentencing recommendations contained in evaluation reports). The instant record reflects
that the trial court implicitly, if not expressly, considered each factor, especially
defendant's poor prospects for rehabilitation.
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Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court's comments at the sentencing
hearing demonstrate that she was well acquainted with his history, character, and
rehabilitative needs. See Section 76-3-401(2). Indeed, the trial court noted that she was
inclined to impose "significant" prison time before defendant ever expressed his disdain
for diagnostic evaluations. R6470:63 at 7-8. Although defendant's chances for
rehabilitation were slim, the trial court expressed willingness to consider probation,
depending on the results of a 90-day diagnostic evaluation. Id The court's comments are
presumably based on her familiarity with the PSI and PSI Addendum, which defendant
wholly ignores. See, e.g., R6470:63 at 1-2, 4, 7-8. The PSI and PSI Addendum explore
in great detail his responses to the current charges, including his failure to cooperate in
the investigations, his lengthy and dismal drug history, and the unlikely probability that he
would benefit from, or sufficiently commit to, yet another drug abuse treatment program.
Supp. at 1-10. Added to this information was the trial court's own exchange with
defendant wherein he made plain his contempt for, and refusal to undergo, a diagnostic
evaluation. See R6470:63 at 8-9. Thus, the information before the trial court clearly and
extensively documented defendant's history, his character, and his rehabilitative
prospects, which appeared doubtful at best. Id. Consequently, the mere "brevity of the
sentencing order does not make the order and the facts surrounding the order so
ambiguous that it would be unreasonable for [the Court] to conclude that the trial court
properly considered the factors in section 76-3-401(4)." Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 12.
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State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, 52 P.3d 451, cited by defendant, is not to the
contrary. This Court rejected the consecutive sentence imposed there because the record
did not reflect that the trial court considered any other factor than the "gravity and
circumstances" of the crimes at issue. Id. at f 48 (quoting section 76-3-401(4)). As
demonstrated above, however, the trial court's comments here—particularly its desire for
a 90-day diagnostic evaluation—reflect its familiarity with the information set forth in the
PSI and PSI Addendum, which covered all the relevant statutory criteria. See Supp. 1-16.
See also Section 76-3-401(2).
Notwithstanding the above, defendant complains that the trial court did not
comment on AP&P's recommendation for concurrent sentences. Aplt. Br. at 20-21.
Defendant again suggests that the court's silence in this respect shows her failure to
consider all legally relevant factors. Id. For all the reasons stated above, including the
trial court's obvious familiarity with the PSI and PSI Addendum, defendant's claim fails
to show that all legally relevant factors were not considered. The fact that the trial court
did not reference the recommendation does not mean that the trial court did not read the
rest of the report. Indeed, the trial court's familiarity with defendant's history belies that
claim. Moreover, a trial court is not bound to follow the recommendations of either the
prosecutor or AP&P. See State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1302 (Utah App. 1989)
("[T]here is no reason to set aside a guilty plea if the court did not follow the prosecutor's

24

recommendations, even if the defendant is disappointed with the severity of the
sentence").
Because the trial court had before it, and was familiar with, information detailing
all legally relevant factors, the only supportable legal conclusion is that it appropriately
considered all of the evidence before sentencing defendant to consecutive indeterminate
prison terms. In other words, where the record shows that the trial court had before it
information regarding all the statutory factors, a reviewing court assumes that the trial
court considered them. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651-652 (Utah App. 1997)
(sentencing court properly considered statutory factors where relevant evidence was
presented through record evidence, including PSI). That well-settled rule is consistent
with the broad discretion accorded sentencing decisions. In sum, under the undisputed
factual circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] would
take the view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. The trial court, thus,
did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive prison terms and defendant's
sentence should therefore be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's consecutive terms of
incarceration.
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2004; 9:46 A.M.

2

HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. ROBERTS:

6

number 30 and 31?

7
8

Mr. Thomas.

You bet.

We have sentencing on

Are we going to go forward with that today?

THE COURT:

We are.

Okay.

Just a minute.

I'm not seeing my

presentence report.

12

MS. ROBERTS:

13

addendum.

14

Honor.

15

17

These are Robert Craig Thomas.

M S . ROBERTS:

10

16

Your Honor, could we please take

THE COURT:

9

11

Yes.

I have an unmarked addendum if you need one, your

THE COURT:
got it.

There was one, and then there was an

Hang on just one minute.

I'm sure

I've

I do.
Okay.

This is the time set for sentencing.

Is there

18

any legal reason known to you why we should not proceed with

19

sentencing at this juncture?

20

MS. ROBERTS:

21

THE COURT:

None, your Honor.
Are there any inaccuracies or omissions

22

that have not been previously pointed out that you want to call

23

to my attention?

24
25

MS. ROBERTS:

Oh, there's only one.

On page 5, there

is a mention of the - and that is on the original presentence

1

report.

2

was — it's unclear whether there is some restitution owed to

3

Mr. Kroll.

4

statement and restitution.

5

I think there's a typo there that says that there

I'm sorry.

It's page 9, the bottom, victim impact
It says:

"The police report did not cite any

6

contact information concerning anyone named

7

Spencer Kroll since the defendant was

8

apprehended, and the above check was not

9

cashed."

10
11

I think that AP&P meant to write, "It does not appear
restitution is owed in this case."

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. ROBERTS:

14

THE COURT:

15

And that seems to me to be what it means.
That's the only thing that I know of.

All right.

And you've had a chance to go

through the report with the defendant?

16

MS. ROBERTS:

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. ROBERTS:

I have, your Honor.
I'm happy to hear (inaudible).
Okay.

Your Honor, I think the bottom

19

line in this case is really that Odyssey House is the only hope

20

for Mr. Thomas.

21

they would recoinmend that he be able to enter an inpatient

22

program if one was available.

23

yesterday, and there will be a bed December or January.

24

as specific as he can be.

25

We did have an agreement with the D.A. that

I've spoken to Mark Augustine
That's

I'd just like to point out a few things to the Court,

1

if I could.

2

THE COURT:

All right.

3

MS. ROBERTS:

The first case that came before me for

4

Mr. Thomas, he pled to that case at roll call.

That was the

5

case involving the incident August 11th, 2004.

Then we found

6

out he had another case with more charges; that's why you have

7

the addendum here.

8
9

He has, as long as I've know him, always taken full
responsibility for these matters, and has also spoken to me

10

that he is an addict, that he knows that, that he knows that —

11

that he feels that the CATS program was not enough, and that he

12

wants to do an intensive inpatient program.

13

for First Step.

14

Odyssey.

He didn't even ask

He said that it could be nothing less than

15

I know that AP&P is very clear about their

16

recommendation, because they feel that he will not — he's just

17

not able to be rehabilitated, and we simply don't agree with

18

that.

19

what AP&P says.

20

he successfully completed parole.

First of all, he has succeeded on parole, contrary to
They noted on page 5 that between "9 6 and "99

21

THE COURT:

We haven't done a diagnostic, have we?

22

MS. ROBERTS:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

MS. ROBERTS:

I don't think so.
I think a diagnostic evaluation may be —
Well, I did one in Idaho.
In Idaho?

A long time ago?

1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

Yeah.

And I just got -

No. I mean recently in connection with my

3

case.

I may find to order a diagnostic given the intensity of

4

the statement of AP&P's recommendation and the possibility

5

XXXX.

6

MS. ROBERTS:

7

THE COURT:

8

Okay.
I'm going to order a sixty-day diagnostic

evaluation.

9

Mr. Parker?

10

MR. PARKER:

Your Honor, the Court should know that

11

one of the victims is present in court today, as well as the

12

spouse of one of the other victims.

13

them wanted to address the Court.

14

THE COURT:

15

Do you mind standing over by the jury box with your

16

MR. PARKER:

Both of them would like to speak, your

Honor.

19
20

I'd like to hear from them.

client?

17
18

All right.

I believe at least one of

THE COURT:

All right.

I'd like to hear from both of

you.

21

A WOMAN:

Your Honor, I need to read this.

22

THE COURT:

23

A WOMAN:

That's fine.
Okay.

I am a victim of Mr. Thomas's

24

actions and dishonesty.

That is the Mr. Thomas that takes the

25

court and judge's orders and sentences very flippant.

He uses

1

the system.

2

I do believe that he premeditates his actions.

3

have cost not just a monetary amount, but the time and a great

4

deal of anguish.

5

He is disrespectful of people and their property.
His actions

It has caused me health problems, interrupted my

6

life, and seems never to end, go away, or lessen.

7

and very nervous.

8

this is all quite a joke.

I'm paranoid

He is a villain, and I think he just thinks

9

I request that Mr. Thomas be given a sentence that

10

will make him review his actions and realize what he does to

11

others, and find respect for the judicial system.

12

that he can be enrolled in programs that can help him change

13

his life around.

And I hope

Thank you, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Very well put.

15

Does someone else wish to speak?

16

MR. GERBER:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. GERBER:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. GERBER:

And your name, sir?

My name is Kent Gerber.
Yes.
My wife is Danielle Gerber.
Yes, Mr. Gerber.
And I wish my wife were here today.

21

She's out of the country with my son on a trip that had been

22

planned many months ago and wasn't able to postpone it or

23

change it.

24
25

The lady who just addressed the Court I'm sure
represents a lot of the feelings of my wife.

She felt

1

violated.

She — she had her wallet stolen; consequently, her

2

identity.

She lost cash.

3

photos that were in her wallet that she misses and are

4

irreplaceable.

5

She lost wonderful sentimental

She — we were notified the evening of the theft

6

that — by our credit union that a large amount of charges were

7

coming in on her credit card, and they wondered if she had made

8

them, and so she went to check her purse, and the wallet was

9

missing.

10

Up until that time she didn't even know.
Mr. Thomas obviously had been quickly going around

11

the area charging gas and hundreds, many hundreds, of dollars

12

worth of goods at various department stores.

13

apprehended, as I understand it, at Meier & Frank.

14

rate, my wife, being a rather sensitive person, a naturalized

15

citizen of about forty years, she just didn't think this could

16

happen in the United States of America.

17

He was
At any

And she — she was disappointed, but traumatized.

She

18

knew that she didn't know who this man was.

19

would be helpful for her to be here today to see his face so

20

that at least she would in the future, if she were around him,

21

would know that he was the one who had done this to her.

22

She — she — it

She — she feels insecure because she knows that he

23

knows who she is and where she lives, and has various numbers

24

that relate to her identity.

25

much effort to change cards, driver's licenses, Social

She, of course, had to go through

1

Security, and it took her over a month and a half of continual

2

stress with a particular company that had the largest amount of

3

charges, even though they were the ones that notified the

4

police, generally speaking.

5

because their head offices were out of town, and it's been very

6

traumatic.

They were the most difficult

7

And I just second what the — the lady said.

8

recognize he — he has problems, but he's caused a great deal of

9

harm to other people, and I think that if there are choices,

10

that he should receive something on the severe side.

11

you.

I

Thank

12

THE COURT:

13

Would the State like to be heard, Mr. Parker, today?

14

MR. PARKER:

15

THE COURT:

16

Thank you.

No.

We'll submit it, your Honor.

Do you have any objection to a

diagnostic —

17

MR. PARKER:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. PARKER:

20

THE COURT:

I do not.
- evaluation at the Utah State Prison?
I do not.
I'll be frank with you, counsel, and

21

indicate to you that I'm doing the diagnostic evaluation

22

because I believe in looking at all alternatives, but frankly

23

at this point I'm inclined to send him to prison.

24

see how he performs in the diagnostic unit, and whatever the

But we will

25 I penalty is going to be it's going to involve a significant
7

1

amount of time behind bars.

2

You need to be prepared for that.

It's not going to

3

be a month or two.

And so I'd put your best foot forward, sir,

4

at the diagnostic center, and if you do treat this as a joke,

5

or flippantly, as the individual has indicated, when you're in

6

for evaluation, the consequences will be real and significant.

7

Do you understand me?

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

10

this ninety days hence.

11

ninety-day diagnostic evaluation.

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

doing no evaluation.

16

THE COURT:

17

time served.

18

evaluation?

Forthwith - and we'll set

I think I'm going to ask for a

Just send me to prison, then.

You'd just like to go to prison?
Just send me to prison.

I ain't wasting ninety days.
You don't waste it.

You get credit for

You don't think you can do a diagnostic

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

THE DEFENDANT:

I can do a diagnostic.

So why don't you want to do it?
Because they're going to recommend

22

prison automatic.

23

front of anybody, I went straight to prison.

24

prison.

25

I ain't

Every — your Honor, every time I've been in
They send me to

I don't get no chance in there.
I'm a drug addict.

I'm sorry for what I did to them
8

1

people.

You think I like doing what I do?

2

doing it.

3

help.

4

what I say, no matter what I do in diagnostic, they're going to

5

send me to prison.

6

board's going to look at that ninety days, and they're going to

7

go, "So what?"

I want to go to Odyssey House where I can get some

Diagnostic — I'm going to go to diagnostic.

THE COURT:

9

decision; I make the decision.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

to be desired.

No matter

They're going to send me to prison.

8

10

No, I don't like

The

First of all, they don't make the
But your attitude leaves a lot

Do you want to go directly to prison?

THE DEFENDANT:

I want to go to Odyssey House where I

can get some help is where I want to go, your Honor.
THE COURT:
evaluation.

That's why I'm doing the diagnostic

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT:

No, I don't.

I really don't.

All I

know is every time I get around them, they send me to prison.
THE COURT:

Will you confer with your client, or

should I just send him to prison?
MS. ROBERTS:

Your Honor, if I could take a minute

with him in the holding cell.

21

THE COURT:

You may.

22

MS. ROBERTS:

Thank you.

23

(The Court gave attention to other

24

matters on the call.)

25

THE COURT:

We have a theft by receiving, a third,

1

and a forgery, a third.

2

MS. ROBERTS:

3

THE COURT:

Is that correct, counsel?
I believe so.

Mr. Thomas, your attitude has had an

4

impact on me.

I'm inclined to do what you've asked and to do

5

it, and that is sentence you to prison.

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

Okay, your Honor.

Thank you.

It will be the order of the Court that

8

Mr. Thomas is sentenced to prison on the third-degree felony to

9

the indeterminate term of zero to five years.

On the forgery,

10

it's to run consecutive, and it's also a zero-to-five

11

commitment, forthwith.

12

Is he entitled to any credit for time served?

13

MS. ROBERTS:

14

He is, your Honor.

August, I believe August 11 th .

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17
18
19

He's been in since

Did she say consecutive?

I said consecutive.

Your attitude has

made a big difference in what I intended to do.
Could you calculate the exact time, counsel, and he's
entitled to credit for time served.

20

MS. ROBERTS:

We'll do that,

21 I

(Proceedings concluded at 10:06 a.m.)

22
23
24
25
10
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